Group Rights, Group Intentions, and the Value of Groups by Luban, David
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2018 
Group Rights, Group Intentions, and the Value of Groups 
David Luban 
Georgetown University Law Center, luband@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 




David Luban, Group Rights, Group Intentions, and the Value of Groups, J. Genocide Res. 
(forthcoming) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 




Georgetown University Law Center 
 
[forthcoming, Journal of Genocide Research] 
 
Abstract 
This paper is part of a symposium on Berel Lang’s 2016 book 
Genocide: The Act as Idea (University of Pennsylvania Press). 
While agreeing with much of Lang’s important argument about 
the moral significance of criminalizing genocide as a crime 
against groups, I raise several objections and questions. Lang ties 
the crime of genocide to group rights, specifically the right of 
groups to exist in the future; I argue that the concept of group 
rights obscures rather than clarifies the crime of genocide. What 
matters is not the rights of groups but the value of groups, both to 
their members and to non-members. The two leading accounts are 
those of Arendt and Lemkin, one pluralist and one universalist, 
and Lang leaves the issue dividing them unresolved. He also 
neglects an important objection to the criminalization of genocide, 
namely that placing so much emphasis on groups invites just the 
kind of tribalist mentality that fosters genocide. Finally, I raise 
doubts about Lang’s claim that anyone who commits genocide 
knows it is wrong. 
 
Berel Lang has written a deeply thought and thought-provoking 
book on the distinctive moral importance of the concept of genocide. 
Lang’s central claim is that “genocide” is an indispensable moral 
and legal concept, because it names a unique kind of crime: the 
murder of a group, over and above the murder of individuals in the 
group. Perceptively, Lang argues that genocide is also a radical 
assault on individual autonomy, because victims are destroyed for 
reasons having nothing to do with their own acts or choices (34-36). 
This double nature of the crime – an assault on groups and an assault 
on individuals – gives genocide a unique status. This is one of the 
book’s most valuable insights. The crimes of persecution and 
apartheid, as defined in various international treaties, have the same 
double character, but genocide alone aims not simply at group 
oppression but group murder. 
 In the comments that follow, I will examine several aspects 
of the focus on groups and morality that is so central to Lang’s 
analyses of the ideas behind acts of genocide. 
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Group rights  
One of Lang’s compelling ideas is that by recognizing and 
naming hitherto-unnamed evils, we simultaneously recognize the 
goods these evils assault. That is how moral imagination progresses. 
Thus, by recognizing the murder of groups as a distinctive form of 
evil and a distinctive crime, we simultaneously recognize the 
distinctive importance of groups and group rights (40-43). 
 Surely Lang is right that the concept of genocide implies the 
importance of groups as such. He is also right that the Convention 
Against Genocide (CAG) takes a step toward that recognition by 
distinguishing genocide – the murder of groups – from the mass 
murder of individuals (what international law labels the “crime 
against humanity of extermination”). As Lang reminds us, two of 
the Article 2 crimes in the CAG “do not involve the physical murder 
of individuals” and therefore “they make sense … only when the 
purpose of designating genocide a crime is understood to construct 
protection for a group, not (primarily) for individuals” (91).1 
But I am skeptical that talk of group rights aids us in 
understanding the importance of groups, and I doubt that the concept 
of group rights is “implicit” in the recognition of genocide as a 
crime, as Lang asserts (4). The specific group right that genocide 
attacks is “the group’s right to exist in the future” (144). The right 
to exist, however, is a slippery concept, as becomes clear when we 
ask what the correlative duties to that right are, and on whom they 
fall. Notably, the CAG does not invoke group rights. The CAG 
enunciates just two pertinent duties, imposed on states: to prevent 
genocide and to punish it.2 Hence, the correlative “right to exist” is, 
                                                        
1
 Article 2(d) criminalizes “imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
a group,” while 2(e) criminalizes “forcibly transferring children out of the group 
to another group.” By contrast, the crime against humanity of extermination 
consists of killing one or more persons “as part of a mass killing of members of a 
civilian population.” Elements 1 and 2 under Article 7(1)(b), ICC Elements of 
Crimes (2011), p. 6. Extermination, unlike genocide, requires killing and ignores 
birth-prevention and transfer of children. 
2
 Even here, it remains radically unclear on whom the obligation to prevent and 
punish genocide falls. The International Court of Justice has declared that states’ 
obligation to prevent genocide means the obligation “to employ all means 
reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible” – but 
then the ICJ goes on to explain that what actions are “reasonably available” varies 
widely depending on a state’s “capacity to influence” the genocidal actors, and 
may be limited by international law. Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & 
Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (Judgment of Feb. 26), §430. I find the 
ICJ’s opinion hopelessly, even disingenuously, wishy-washy – on the one hand 
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simply, the right not to be targeted for destruction, that is, for 
genocide (132). 
But this right does not entail a more robust right to exist, 
correlated with other duties. For example, one way religious groups 
cease to exist is that, over time, the ranks of the worshippers 
dwindle, through conversion or loss of faith. The pagan religions of 
Greece and Rome died by attrition, not by genocide, although 
Christian persecution of the pagans undoubtedly hastened their end. 
It makes little sense to say that these faith communities (as we might 
call them today) had a “right to exist,” if this implies that at least 
some people had a duty to worship Zeus or Jupiter. 
No group’s right to exist implies a moral duty of continued 
membership on those born into it. Worse still would be a legally 
enforced duty not to exit; indeed, laws forbidding religious 
conversion violate both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3 
Although Lang acknowledges the tension between the supposed 
group right to exist and individuals’ right to exit the group (141, 
147), he brushes aside the problem it creates for a robust concept of 
group rights (147). 
So too, a dwindling religious or linguistic community has no 
right to exist that implies a duty on the part of the larger community 
to keep it on artificial life support by pouring resources into it – for 
example, by subsidizing Gaelic schools in Ireland, or requiring Irish 
school children to study Gaelic. Well and good if Irish voters decide 
to take such steps to preserve the historical language; but the voters 
have no duty to do so – no more than the Norwegians have a duty to 
financially support the handful of Fricka-worshippers in their 
devotions. Here, again, Lang recognizes the problem (146-47), but 
he does not say whether he accepts or rejects a state duty to support 
groups against natural attrition, and he offers no defence of such a 
duty. 
 Once we distinguish the correlative duties, it seems clear that 
a group’s right to exist is only its right to be protected from 
destruction (and persecution) – not its non-existent rights to block 
the voluntary exit of group members or to obtain state aid against 
natural attrition. The group’s right to exist is thus a narrow right, not 
a broad right. It follows that to propose that the wrong of genocide 
                                                        
boldly announcing an erga omnes obligation to prevent genocide, but on the other 
hand giving states a trivially easy way out. 
3
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, art. 18(2). 
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is its violation of a group right to exist is a near-tautology.4 It 
wouldn’t be if the group’s right to exist entailed duties other than 
the right against genocide – but it does not. The vocabulary of group 
rights adds no explanatory power to accounts of why genocide is 
and must be a distinctive crime. And it runs the risk of obscuring the 
very real differences among correlative duties inherent in rights 
claims. 
 
Two Concepts of Group Value  
It is more helpful to talk about the value of groups as such, rather 
than group rights. The CAG protects groups because groups are 
valuable, not because they are rights-bearers. The value of groups 
can mean either or both of two things: their value to their members, 
or their value to others – to outsiders or to humanity as a whole. 
Lang focuses on the former. To explain the value of groups to their 
members, he argues quite plausibly that our selves are, 
fundamentally, social in nature. People “are part of a corporate or 
collective ‘self’ closely linked structurally and causally to their 
individual actions and achievements; their capacities and even 
inclinations within this collective would be foreign if not impossible 
for solitary individuals and even for individuals randomly joined” 
(29). National, religious, ethnic, and racial groups are especially 
salient in constructing our “social self” (194). That makes such 
groups “life-giving” (32) for the individual. 
Additionally, Lang claims that the concept of genocide 
represents the group as a person, and “arguably, as … an entity prior 
to the individual person” (32) – by which he evidently means 
ontologically prior, not only chronologically prior. The thesis of 
ontological priority of groups over their members is philosophically 
dubious, but undoubtedly group-identities matter to most people, 
which is really all Lang needs for his argument.5  
 The crucial question is whether groups have value to non-
members as well as members. This question matters when we ask 
why the CAG imposes international obligations on states to combat 
genocide even if the victims are distant strangers in far-off lands. As 
Michael Ignatieff explains: 
 
                                                        
4
 Only a near-tautology, because I believe the group’s right to exist also entails a 
duty to be protected from persecution and oppression short of genocide. 
5
 I have criticized the strong ontological-priority thesis that groups “constitute” 
the individual self: David Luban, “The Self: Metaphysical Not Political,” Legal 
Theory 1, no. 4 (1995): 401–437. But my argument does not deny that groups 
matter immensely to most of their members. 
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When Claude Lanzmann was filming Shoah, he asked 
a Polish peasant whose fields abutted a death camp 
what he felt when he saw human ash from the 
crematoria chimneys raining down on his fields. The 
peasant replied: “When I cut my finger, I feel it. When 
you cut your finger, you feel it.” The man’s reply takes 
us to the heart of the problem of genocide. … Why is 
a crime committed against Jews or any other human 
group a crime against those who do not belong to that 
group?6 
 
The two most famous answers to Ignatieff’s final question are 
those of Raphael Lemkin, one of Lang’s heroes (125), and Hannah 
Arendt – and they are very different.7 Where Lemkin’s explanation 
of the value of groups is universalist, Arendt’s is radically pluralist. 
For Lemkin, what makes groups valuable is the distinctive 
contributions that “nations” make to universal civilization. The Poles 
gave the world “a Copernicus, a Chopin, a Curie; the Czechs, a Huss, 
a Dvorak; the Greeks, a Plato and a Socrates; the Russians, a Tolstoy 
and a Shostakovich.”8 For Arendt, the evil of genocide is not that 
the nations are wellsprings feeding human civilization, but that 
genocide “is an attack upon human diversity as such, that is, upon a 
characteristic of the ‘human status’ without which the very words 
‘mankind’ or ‘humanity’ would be devoid of meaning.”9 Genocide 
matters internationally not because the victim group contributes to 
universal civilization but because without international legal 
protection, “no people on earth … can feel reasonably assured of its 
continued existence” given the terrifying efficacy of modern 
military technology and the precedent the Holocaust sets.10  
 Lemkin’s universalist theory of group value assumes a 
“world community,” a cosmopolitan “heritage [that] is a product of 
the contributions of all people.”11 Arendt’s pluralist explanation 
assumes no such thing, and indeed the value she places on “human 
diversity as such” suggests the opposite, that what matters is 
                                                        
6
 Michael Ignatieff, “Lemkin’s Word,” The New Republic, 26 February 2001, 25, 
available at https://newrepublic.com/article/62613/lemkins-word. 
7
 Lang devotes a chapter of his book to each of them. 
8
 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis 
of Government, Proposal for Redress (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1944), 91. See more generally 74-95. 
9
 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, rev. 
ed., (New York: Viking, 1963), 269. 
10
 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 273. 
11
 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 91. 
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difference rather than commonality. No doubt Lemkin’s 
universalism and Arendt’s pluralism aren’t the only possible 
theories of group value, but they are the iconic ones. 
Disappointingly, Lang bypasses this crucial debate, and he offers no 
answer to Ignatieff’s question: why is a crime committed against one 
group a crime against those outside that group?12  
Perhaps Lang believes that the only value groups have is 
value to their members. If so, his theory is more individualistic than 
it seems, in the sense that he derives the value of groups entirely 
from their importance to the lives of their members. That is a 
respectable position. However, it implies that if membership in a 
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group ceases to be an important 
source of meaning for group members (perhaps because they have 
assimilated into their larger society), the group’s value diminishes. 
This corollary would be a setback to the criminalization of genocide; 
presumably, Lang would not disagree. 
Here, perhaps, a possible solution is one the ICTY proposed 
to answer the question of what constitutes an ethnic group, given 
that members’ own level of ethnic self-identification varies. ICTY 
concluded that what matters is not self-identification but that their 
enemies stigmatize them as a group and target them accordingly.13 
Analogously, perhaps what makes groups valuable enough to 
protect is, fundamentally, that the génocidaires think they are 
valuable enough to destroy. 
 
Pushback Against the Concept of Genocide 
Whether international law needs a separate crime of genocide in 
addition to the Nuremberg Charter’s crime of extermination, and if 
so whether the CAG and the Rome Statute get the definition right, 
has been hotly disputed over the years. Lang devotes two chapters 
to rebutting critics of the concept of genocide: Marc Nichalanian, 
Larry May, and Paul Boghossian. I will not discuss Nichalanian or 
May, or Lang’s responses to them, but I will make a few remarks 
about Lang’s response to Boghossian’s complaints about the legal 
definition of genocide.  
 Boghossian complains that key parts of the definition are 
arbitrary or vague. Why protect only national, ethnic, racial, and 
religious groups? Why not other categories, or different 
                                                        
12
 Lang does mention Lemkin’s “civilization” theory in passing (131). 
13
 Prosecutor v. Jeliseć, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, §§70-71 (Dec. 14, 
1999). 
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categories?14 For instance, the Nuremberg Charter’s definition of 
persecution contains a different list of protected groups: political, 
racial, or religious – and the Rome Statute of the ICC has yet another 
list of groups protected from persecution: political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or “other grounds that are 
universally recognised as impermissible under international law.”15 
When we lay the CAG side by side with these lists, the irresistible 
question is: why this one and not that one? 
 To this objection, Lang offers the right response: the four 
categories in the CAG are all groupings that recognizably matter to 
people, and nothing stops the UN or the ICC from eventually 
expanding the list of protected groups in the definition of genocide 
(15, 31-32, 94). Lang could have made the case stronger, however, 
and warded off the counter-argument that reopening major 
international treaties is perilous, by referencing domestic law, which 
is far easier to change. Importantly, the genocide laws of several 
countries do expand the list. Colombia and Ethiopia include political 
groups, Lithuania includes political and social groups, and Costa 
Rica adds groups determined by age, political or sexual orientation, 
social position, economic situation, or civil status. France and 
Burkina Faso add to the CAG’s list all groups determined by “any 
other arbitrary criterion.”16  
 Boghossian also objects to the CAG’s definition of genocide 
as destruction of a protected group “in whole or in part,” because of 
the fatal vagueness of “in part” – after all, even a single person is a 
part of her group.17 Again, Lang offers the right response: 
Boghossian reads the definition too formalistically; interpreted 
through its purpose and context, it is clear that the part must be 
substantial (93). Here too, Lang could have buttressed his case using 
legal sources. For example, the US genocide statute stipulates that 
the part must be substantial, and “substantial” means that destroying 
it would “cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within 
the nation of which such group is a part.”18 A viability test likewise 
underlies the ICTY’s reasoning in its crucial Krstić decision, which 
found that the Srebreniča massacre was a genocide: killing the 
Muslim males and expelling the women from such a strategic 
                                                        
14
 Paul Boghossian, “The Concept of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 
12, nos. 1-2 (2010): 74-75. 
15
 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) (1946), art. 
6(c); Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(h). These are my examples, not Boghossian’s. 
16
 All these statutes may be found in Prevent Genocide International, The Crime 
of Genocide in Domestic Laws and Penal Codes, available at 
http://preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/. 
17
 Boghossian, “The Concept of Genocide,” 75-76. 
18
 18 U.S.C. §1093(8). 
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location made a “viable” Muslim community around Srebrenica 
impossible.19 
 I mention these legal points because they highlight one 
weakness of Lang’s book: apart from the CAG, he ignores the law, 
even when it supports his conclusions. (So does Boghossian.) Jurists 
have devoted considerable thought to virtually every contestable 
clause of the genocide definition, and while the detailed treatments 
by the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC may well have gotten things wrong, 
philosophers should not ignore them and write their own analyses as 
if on a tabula rasa. 
 
The Tribalism Objection 
There is one important objection to the concept of genocide that 
Lang does not consider or rebut – and in my view it is the most 
consequential. The worry is that focusing on groups as such, rather 
than individuals, reinforces rather than combatting the kind of 
tribalism that gives rise to genocide. Philippe Sands reports that as 
early as 1945 the Austrian intellectual Leopold Kohr warned 
Lemkin that “by making groups the ‘prime beneficiary’ of 
protection and international law, Lemkin had fallen into a trap, 
adopting ‘biological thinking’ of the kind that led to anti-Semitism 
and anti-Germanism.”20 Perhaps this was why human rights groups 
opposed the CAG at the UN, to Lemkin’s dismay.21 Sands largely 
agrees with Kohr’s critique. 
 Apparently so did the great international lawyer Sir Hersh 
Lauterpacht, who was responsible for the term “crimes against 
humanity” in the Nuremberg Charter. Sands depicts Lauterpacht as 
Lemkin’s intellectual adversary, precisely because Lauterpacht 
feared that emphasizing groups would devalue international human 
rights for individuals.22 Lauterpacht’s opposition may explain why 
                                                        
19
 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004), 
§15. Conversely, in its recent Mladić judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
concluded that the Muslims killed in six other municipalities were not a 
“substantial part” of the Bosnian Muslims. Prosecutor v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-
92-T, Trial Judgment, vol. 3 (Nov. 22, 2017), §§3527-3535 (pp. 1795-1801), 
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-3of5_1.pdf. 
20
 Philippe Sands, East-West Street: On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes 
Against Humanity”, (New York: Knopf, 2016), 184-85. The internal quotations 
are from Kohr’s letter to Lemkin. 
21
 Raphael Lemkin, Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, 
ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 170. 
22
 Sands, East-West Street, 110, 324, 327. Historian James Loeffler contends that 
Sands’s contrast is overdrawn: far from being an individualist, Lauterpacht was a 
lifelong Zionist with a passionate concern for the rights of minority groups. 
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Lemkin failed at Nuremberg. Although the Nuremberg indictment 
listed genocide among the war crimes, the lawyers and judges 
ignored it during the trial, instead convicting defendants of crimes 
against humanity. When the Tribunal read its verdict without 
mentioning genocide, Lemkin called it “the blackest day” of his 
life.23 
Although Lang alludes to Lauterpacht’s objection (175), he 
never confronts the worry that the concept of genocide might 
reinforce tribal thinking in the effort to prevent and punish its most 
lethal consequence. 
 
Intending Genocide Versus Intending Evil 
One of Lang’s most significant claims is that anyone who commits 
genocide knows it is wrong (38; 161). Here, he disagrees with 
Arendt, who thought she had discovered in Adolf Eichmann a “type 
of criminal, who … commits his crimes under circumstances that 
make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is 
doing wrong.”24 What circumstances? She held that Germany had 
undergone a “moral collapse,” in which rules like “Thou shalt not 
kill” were flipped upside-down.25 That made it hard for a moral 
chameleon like Eichmann, whose conscience mimicked the 
prevailing ideology, to recognize the evil he was doing.26 Lang, by 
contrast, asserts that nobody can fail to recognize the wrong in 
genocide, regardless of the prevailing ideology. 
But this seems historically untrue. In the Hebrew Bible, God 
commands Saul to commit genocide, and then punishes him for 
disobeying – evidence, surely, that there was no condemnation of 
genocide in the ancient Middle East.27 Lang mentions this biblical 
passage (53, 162), but without drawing the conclusion that 
recognizing the evil of genocide depends on prevailing cultural 
norms. Perhaps he disagrees with Arendt because of skepticism that 
morality could invert itself so abruptly in Germany. It’s true that 
                                                        
Rooted Cosmopolitans: Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, forthcoming). 
23
 Sands, East-West Street, 358. 
24
 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 276; also 26. 
25
 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 125, 150. See also Arendt, “Personal 
Responsibility Under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome 
Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003), 24, 34; “Some Questions of Moral 
Philosophy,” in Responsibility and Judgment, 138. 
26
 Several excellent historians, notably Bettina Stangneth, think Eichmann was in 
fact a dyed-in-the-wool antisemite. Lang argues that the source material Stangneth 
unearthed can bear either her interpretation or Arendt’s (155-56). I agree. 
27
 1 Samuel 15:1-26. Saul did not shrink from genocide on moral grounds, for he 
killed all but one of the Amalekites. 
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Arendt’s “moral collapse” thesis raises perplexing questions of how 
morality unexpectedly turned upside-down. But Lang’s view also 
invites a hard question: if the evil of genocide is self-evident, how 
did so many thousands of Germans and East Europeans deliberately 
choose it?  
It seems that Lang’s own understanding of how groups shape 
our consciousness and our choices should incline him more toward 
Arendt’s explanation. Nazi ideology intensified us-versus-them 
group consciousness in the form of race hatred; and once it reached 
a tipping point, the abnormal became the new normal. Those who 
thoughtlessly identify doing the right thing with doing the normal 
thing – the group thing, one might say – will have a hard time 
recognizing evil when it is a group enterprise. Even the foot-soldiers 
who pull triggers may lack genocidal purpose, acting instead out of 
a shoulder-shrugging “ours not to reason why” outlook. Of course, 
they intend to kill, but that does not imply they intend to destroy the 
group as such, which in any case is beyond a foot-soldier’s power. 
And their leaders have told them that if this is evil, it is a necessary 
evil – which may cause them to doubt it is evil at all. 
 The Lang-Arendt disagreement matters for the legal 
punishment of genocide. That is because the crime requires proof of 
genocidal intent. A consequence of Lang’s view is that anyone who 
participates in genocide knows he is doing wrong: his knowledge of 
the genocide becomes morally equivalent with genocidal intent (38-
39, 105). Several prominent legal scholars likewise favor a 
knowledge-based theory of genocidal intent, precisely in order to 
ensure that foot-soldiers who knowingly engage in genocide cannot 
escape liability by denying they intended it.28 But this creates an 
anomaly: it makes foot-soldiers who merely went along just as 
culpable as the planners and organizers of genocide. That seems 
wrong-headed, and Lang himself is rightly repelled at “the prospect 
of hanging hundreds of thousands of active German agents” (162). 
If there is any drafting flaw in the CAG, it lies in its awkward 
mash-up of individual intentions and inherently collective contexts, 
without distinguishing leaders from foot-soldiers. The CAG offers 
no legal definition of “a genocide,” only of individual acts of 
genocide.29 Yet an individual killing cannot be an act of genocide 
unless it takes place as part of a genocide, that is, a group enterprise 
in which genocidal intention is unevenly distributed within the 
                                                        
28
 Sangkul Kim gives a helpful overview and critique of such knowledge-based 
theories of genocidal intent. A Collective Theory of Genocidal Intent (The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser, 2016), 22-80. 
29
 Kim, A Collective Theory of Genocidal Intent,105. Kim’s book is the most 
comprehensive treatment of genocidal intent, and he concludes that it is a mistake 
to focus on individual rather than collective intent. 
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group. Lang, who has thought so deeply about group responsibility, 
ought to agree. 
